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on the basis that the anti-assignment act is not applicable to suits by subrogees
because the subrogation arises by operation of law rather than voluntarily.10
In reaching the decision in the instant case, the court reasoned that had
Congress intended to exclude suits by subrogees they would have added such an
exception to the twelve other definite exceptions which are included in the act,
and that it was the intent of the legislature to relieve themselves of considering all
these private claims as was necessary before the Federal Torts Claims Act, and
were aware at the time of passing the act that suits by subrogees would arise. In
the instant case, the court also refers to an opinion of the Attorney Generalll that
the Small Torts Claims act which preceded the Federal Torts Claims act included
suits by subrogees, and this opinion was consistently followed by Congress in
appropriating sums for the payment of subrogated claims. The court reasons that
as the language of the act was similar, and that act was the forerunner of the
Federal Torts Claims act, that subrogation should also be allowed under the
latter act.
In view of the fact that the only three decisions of the Federal Courts of
Appeal on the subject have been reversals of District Courts which did not allow
the suit by the subrogee, it seems to become more apparent that the matter might
possibly become more or less settled before the opportunity or necessity for a
decision by the United States Supreme Court arises.
It is submitted that the decisions of the Courts of Appeal have been correct
in their interpretation and application of the act as to subrogees. The historical
background and the reasons for the passage of the act, as well as the obvious probability that such suits would be brought and could have been excluded are considerations which could hardly be overlooked, and which were given insufficient
attention by the Federal District Courts when they construed and applied the
act strictly and thus denied the subrogee the right to sue on mere technicalities.
JOHN 0.

ILLEGAL DETENTION ALONE
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A

CONFESSION

Appellant, arrested for grand larceny, was held for three days without

charges being filed against him; thus, his detention was illegal, because in violation
of a statute requiring prompt arraignment. Appellant confessed to the theft during
a thirty hour period after being taken into custody. Although he had been question five times before confession, the questioning was shown to have been neither
coercive nor extensive. Appellant appealed from conviction on the sole basis that
he had been detained an unreasonable time after arrest before the confession was
made. Held, illegal detention alone is sufficient to invalidate a confession although
10. Grace to use of Grangers Mutual Ins. Co. v. U. S., 76 F. Supp. 174- (Maryland 1948) ;
Hill v. U. S., 74 F. Supp. 129 (N. D. Tex. 1947); Wojciuk v. U. S., 74 F. Supp. 914
(E. D. Wis. 1947); Town of Amherst v. U. S., 77 F. Supp. 80 (W. D. N. Y. 1948);
State Road Dept. of Florida v. U. S., 78 F. Supp. 278 (N. D. Florida 1948).
11. 36 Op. Atty. Gen. 553, cited in Employers Fire Ins. Co. v. U. S., 167 F. (2d) 655 (C. A.
9th 1948).
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the confession was not induced by such detention and regardless of whether
torture, physical, or psychological factors were present. Upshaw v. United States.
335 U. S.410, 69 Sup. Ct. 170 (1948).
An involuntary confession, i. e., one which has been extracted through the
use of physical violence or threats, induced by the promise of certain pardon, or
obtained under mental stress, is inadmissible in evidence as being testimonially
untrustworthy.1 Hitherto, the courts have not excluded a confession, if voluntarily made, because of any illegality in the method of obtaining it or because of
2
the confessor's peculiar temperament or situation at the time of confessing. Thus,
the mere fact that a confession was obtained while the confessor was under arrest
did not invalidate the confession, but the arrest was considered by the court only
as a factor involved in determining its nature. 3 However, a Texas Statute
4
requires confessions made while under arrest to be in writing.
In 1943, the United States Supreme Court set forth the principle that a confession made while the confessor was in illegal custody was inadmissible, though
otherwise trustworthy. 5 The McNabb case was a sudden departure from the rule
formerly applied in the Federal Courts as to the admissibility or confessions.6
Prior to this doctrine, stated in the McNabb case, it was immaterial whether there
had been an unreasonable delay in arraignment, or illegal detention of the accused.7 A few of the state courts approved the McNabb doctrine, 8 but most of the
courts declined to be bound by the decision or to follow the court's reasoning. 9
This was true even though most of the states had enacted prompt arraignment
statutes.10 The lower Federal Courts were bound by the McNabb doctrine but
through different interpretations of the holding in the case, have brought about
antithetical results.11
Thus, the doctrine of the lower Federal Courts with regard to confessions
obtained during a period of illegal detention had been vague and uncertain until
1. 3 Wigmore, Evidence, sees. 822-826 (3d ed. 1940).

2. Ibid.
3. Smith v. State, 248 Ala. 363, 27 So. (2d) 495 (1946) ; Wright v. United States, 159
F. (2d) 3 (C. C. A. 8th 1947).
4. Vernon's Code Crim. Proc. of Texas, Ann., art. 727 (1948).
5. McNabb v. United States, 318 U. S. 332, 63 Sup. Ct. 608, 87 L. Ed. 819 (1943). Defendants were arrested and taken directly to jail where they were subjected to ques-

tioning over a period of two days in violation of a Federal Statute requiring all
persons arrested to be taken to the nearest magistrate. Held, a conviction obtained
largely on the basis of a confession secured during the two days illegal detention

should be reversed. Without deciding if the confession was voluntarily given, the
court held it inadmissible as evidence, it having been obtained while the defendants
were illegally detained.
6. McNabb v. United States, supra note 5.
7. People v. Alex, 265 N. Y. 192, 192 N. E. 289 (1934) ; Joong Sui Noon v. United States,
76 F. (2d) 249 (C. C. A. 8th 1935) ; People v. Klyczek, 307 Ill. 150, 138 N. E. 275
(1923).

8. Cavalzos v. State, 146 Tex. Crim. App. 144, 172 S. W. (2d) 348 (1943) ; see Foster v.

State, 79 Okla. Crim. 183, 152 P. (2d) 929 (1944).
9. State v. Ellis, 354 Mo. 998, 193 S. W. (2d) 31 (1946), cert. denied, 328 U. S. 873, 66
Sup. Ct. 1374-, 90 L. Ed. 1642 (1946) ; accord, Ford v. State, 184 Tenn. 443, 201 S. W.

(2d) 539 (1945).
10. See 22 C. J. S. sec. 301 ; and the respective state statutes.
11. Cf. United States v. Hoffman, 137 F. (2d) 4-16 (C. C. A. 2d. 1943) with United

States v. Grote, 140 F. (2d) 413 (C. C. A. 2d. 1944), and United States v. Kiee, 50
F. Supp. 679 (E. D. Wash. 1943).
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the present case was decided.12 The McNabb rule was tempered by subsequent
decisions. For example, in United States v. Mitchell,13 the Supreme Court rejected
an interpretation of the McNabb decision to the effect that confessions are inadmissible, although made immediately after arrest, when there had been undue
delay in subsequently arraigning the accused. And, although the McNabb case
seemingly imposed a penalty for police misconduct, the court's opinion in the
Mitchell case made it clear that the McNabb doctrine was not intended to be an
14
indirect mode of disciplining such misconduct.
The majority of the Federal Court decisions since the Mitchell case have
indicated that the sole presence of illegal detention is not sufficient to render a
confession inadmissible unless there are additional aggravating circumstances,15
in other words, that there must be a casual connection between the illegal nature
of the detention and the procurement of the confession.
In view of the reception accorded to the McNabb decision, it is especially
significant that the instant case is not only a reiteration but even an extension of
that doctrine.
If this judicial rule of exclusion of all confessions obtained after illegal detention is followed, it must mean that illegal detention is itself construed by the
court to be coercive, and for that reason it seems likely that this basis of exclusion
will apply to both state and federal courts as a matter of due process. 16 The
instant case will cause the inquiry to shift from the question of whether the confession was voluntary, to the legality of the arrest and restraint. Thus, the effect
of rejecting evidence of probative value so obtained is to punish society at the
expense of affording added protection to offenders. The remedy as suggested by
Mr. Justice Reed, dissenting in the instant case,17 is sounder police discipline,
statutory punishment of offending officials, legislative acts to protect the accused
from methods violating constitutional rights, and other enactments which will
protect both the public and suspects. The rule of the majority opinion in the
present case seems unnecessarily broad in that it permits an accused who has confessed his guilt to remain unpunished.
12. Note, The McNabb Rule Transformed, 47 Col. L. Rev. 1214 (1947).
13. United States v. Mitchell, 322 U. S. 65, 64 Sup. Ct. 896, 88 L. Ed. 1140 (1944). The
defendant was arrested for housebreaking and larceny; and, immediately upon his
arrival at the police station, he admitted his guilt. After this oral confession, the de-

fendant was illegally detained for eight days prior to his arraignment before a committing magistrate. At the trial, defendant's oral confession was admitted in evidence.
Held, this case was distinguishable from the McNabb case because here the disclosure
was not made during the illegal detention and, hence, his confession was properly
admitted in evidence.
14. Ibid.
15. Boone v. United States, 164 F. (2d) 102 (App. D. C. 1947) ; Ruhl v. United States,
148 F. (2d) 173 (C. C. A. 10th 1945) ; Akowskey v. United States, 158 F. (2d) 649
(App. D. C. 1946).
16. See Judge Cooley's widely accepted definition that, "'Due process of law in each
particular case means such an exertion of the powers of government as the settled
maxims of law permit and sanction, and under such safeguards for the protection of
individual rights, as those maxims prescribe for the class of cases to which the one
being dealt with belongs.' Story on the Constitution (5th Ed.) sec. 1945." Dukich v.
Blair, 3 F. (2d) 302 (E. D. Wash. 1925), appeal dismissed, 270 U. S. 670, 46 Sup. Ct.
469, 70 L. Ed. 791 (1925).
17. Upshaw v. United States, 335 U. S. 410, 69 Sup. Ct. 170 (1948).
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Such a rule of exclusion as set forth in the present decision represents a
judicial determination that policies under the due process clause outweigh the
policy underlying the rules of evidence in criminal cases. There is serious doubt
as to the wisdom of such evaluation.
BERNARD E. COLE

TAXATION OF INCOME OF A SHORT-TERM TRUST

The petitioner, beneficiary under a testamentary trust established by his
father, Sam Farkas,1 on January 8, 1943, set up an inter-vivos trust, transferring
to his brother, Mark Farkas, as trustee, all petitioner's right, title, and interest
to the profits, dividends, or income from the Estate of Sam Farkas, such income
to be used by the trustee to educate petitioner's nieces and nephews, and for their
other needs. The trustee was given absolute discretion in determining to whom
and in what amounts the income was to be paid, with authority to dispose of all
or any part of it, provided no portion was to go to petitioner. The trust was to
terminate in ten years or upon the death of the trustee. The trustee, at the termination of the trust, was to dispose of the balance in any manner he saw fit, except
that none was to go to petitioner. Petitioner retained no control whatever over
the corpus, income, or trustee. In 1943 he filed a gift tax return, reporting a gift
of his interest in the testamentary trust; during the same year he reported on his
individual income tax return the income paid to him from this trust before he set
up the inter-vivos trust, while the trustee of the latter reported as trust income
the amount received during the balance of the fiscal year. The Commissioner of
Internal Revenue determined that the full amount of income distributed by the
testamentary trustee as petitioner's share was taxable to petitioner, 2 and therefore
imposed additional taxes. The Tax Court sustained the Commissioner; petitioner
asks for a review. Held, that the petitioner is not taxable on the whole amount.
(a) The interest transferred was an equitable interest in the testamentary trust
estate; (b) there was a complete renunciation by petitioner of any benefits or
control of the property; (c) the trust was for a large portion of the petitioner's
life expectancy; (d) the transfer was a substantial disposition of property and not
merely the anticipatory assignment of future income. Farkas v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, 170 F. (2d) 201 (C. A. 5th 1948).
. See Farkas v. Farkas, 200 Ga. 886, 38 S. E. (2d) 924 (1946), on determination of a
friendly suit brought by present petitioner against the trustee to determine the validity
of this inter-vivos transfer. Also, 166 A. L. R. 1312.
2. 52 Stat. 457 (1938), as amended, 26 U. S. C. A. sec. 22(a) (1948). "'Gross income'
includes gains, profits, and income derived from salaries, wages, or compensation for
personal service . . ., of whatever kind and in whatever form paid, or from professions, vocations, trades, businesses, commerce, or sales, or dealings in property,
whether real or personal, growing out of the ownership or use of or interest in such
property; also from interest, rent, dividends, securities, or the transaction of any
business carried in for gain or profit, or gains or profits and income derived from
"
any source whatever ....

